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ABSTRACT
Immigrant parents are currently burdened with unique risks to their parental rights,
risks that bear little relation to their ability to care for their children. Recent
developments in family and immigration law, historical cultural prejudices against
non-Western parenting traditions, and poor immigrants’ limited access to the U.S.
legal system are largely to blame.
This Note explores the inadequacies in our legal system contributing to the struggles
of immigrant parents to maintain family unity and connects the current situation to
the disproportionate number of terminations of parental rights within the Native
American community in the mid-twentieth century. It suggests that a federal statute
modeled on the Indian Child Welfare Act may be able to comprehensively address
the issues identified herein.
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I. INTRODUCTION

C

irila Baltazar Cruz, a Mexican woman of Chatino descent, gave
birth to a baby girl in a Pascagoula, Mississippi hospital in 2008.1
Ms. Balthazar Cruz, who speaks limited Spanish and very little
English, was questioned about her living situation by a representative
of the hospital’s social services department and a Spanish-speaking
“patient advocate.” 2 The hospital concluded erroneously that Ms.
Baltazar Cruz was trading sex for housing, filed a report with the
Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) against Ms.
Baltazar Cruz alleging parental abuse and neglect, and contacted
federal immigration authorities to investigate Ms. Baltazar Cruz’s
immigration status. 3 MDHS obtained a custody order for her baby,
placed the baby placed in foster care with an unlicensed white couple,4
and began the process of initiating termination of parental rights (TPR)
proceedings against Ms. Baltazar Cruz. 5 MDHS did not provide
Chatino interpretation for Ms. Baltazar Cruz while investigating the
claims against her, and instead requested the mother learn English in
order to be reunited with her daughter. 6 Ms. Baltazar Cruz did not
regain physical custody of her child until November 2009, one year
after giving birth; 7 she did not recover permanent physical custody
until early 2010.8
While Ms. Baltazar Cruz’s parental rights were not ultimately
terminated and she regained custody of her child, her case is a
particularly dramatic example of the trials many immigrant parents in
the United States face in maintaining custody of their children. Data
suggests the U.S. government removed 9 approximately 46,000
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Complaint at 5–6, Cirila Baltazar Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Serv., No.
3:10cv446HTN-LRA (S.D. Miss. 2010). Chatinos are an indigenous community
in Mexico. Id. at 5.
Id. at 6, 10.
Id. at 7–10.
Id. at 6, 10.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
See Diana R. Podgorny, Comment, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal
Measures in Immigration Law as Reflected in the Expansion of the “Aggravated
Felony” Concept, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 287, 295 (2009) (noting that,
in 1996, “removal” replaced “deportation” in immigration law parlance.”).
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immigrant parents of U.S. citizen children in the first six months of
2011 alone and there are currently at least 5,100 children in foster care
whose parents have either been detained or removed.10 The numbers
represent a dramatic increase in rates of removal: the U.S. government
reported removing 108,000 parents of U.S. citizen children between
1998 and 2007.11
Despite these statistics, it is difficult to determine exactly how
many immigrant parents have had their parental rights terminated for
reasons related to their status as immigrants. Immigrant parents rarely
appeal family court decisions for financial and logistical reasons,
especially if the parents are deported and living in a foreign country
from which it is difficult to contest a termination of parental rights
(TPR) decision in a U.S. court.12 Further, since many child custody
case records are sealed, it is impossible to estimate the rate of parental
rights terminations with a high degree of certainty.13 However, in spite
of these difficulties, a few courts have recently considered a few such
termination appeals, giving scholars a glimpse into the legal standards
used to terminate immigrants’ parental rights. 14 Further, recent
10

11

12

13

14

APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS
INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM 5−6 (2011), available at http://arc.org/shatteredfamilies. This data was
collected despite the fact that the U.S. government does not keep records on
whether deported parents leave the country with their children or if the state
transfers their children to foster care even though most children of immigrants
are U.S. citizens. See Francisco Miraval, Thousands of Children of Deported
Parents Get Stuck in Foster Care, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 17, 2011. See
generally Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on
Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 1799, 1809 (2010) (the statistics bely the U.S. government’s contention
that it mainly targets immigrants who have committed serious violent crimes).
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
REMOVALS INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN
CHILDREN 4 (2009), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_0915_Jan09.pdf.
C. Elizabeth Hall, Comment, Where are My Children . . . And My Rights?
Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J.
1459, 1462 (2011).
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2600 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 625.108(2) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:14 (2011) (state
statutes that require all court records pertaining to the termination of parental
rights to be kept confidential).
See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
(reversing the lower court’s termination of an undocumented immigrant
mother’s parental rights after she was picked up in an immigration raid and held
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scholarship has compiled anecdotal data suggesting that substantial
numbers of immigrant parents are struggling to maintain their parental
rights.15 Even if courts ultimately restore custody to the parent upon a
child’s removal from the parent’s custody, as was the case for Ms.
Baltazar Cruz, the months of separation, fear, and insecurity felt by
both parents and children as a function of our nation’s flawed
immigration and family law coordination system is itself a problem
that deserves correction.16
For parents who are undocumented, not fluent in English, poor,
and embrace parenting traditions considered uncommon by American
standards, threats to parental rights are especially acute. In dealing
with these threats, such parents face cultural prejudice, language
barriers, and lack of financial access to an attorney.17 Moreover, if they
are simultaneously detained by immigration officials, they also face
difficulty in adequately defending themselves while in immigration

15

16
17

in detention for many months); In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74,
91–92 (Neb. 2009) (reversing the lower court’s termination of an undocumented
immigrant mother’s parental rights after removal proceedings were initiated
against her); Perez-Velazquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 036009-4, 2009 WL 1851017 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the lower court’s
termination of parental rights of an undocumented immigrant who had been
deported); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COAR3-PT, 2005 WL 975339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s
decision not to terminate the parental rights of an undocumented father who had
been deported).
See, e.g., Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 103 (2011) (concluding after
helping an undocumented mother in Arizona reunify with her child and
conducting surveys and interviews around the state that “her client’s case is not
an anomaly”); Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32
B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63, 82 (2012) (“In undocumented immigrant termination
cases, courts and welfare agencies frequently conclude that a parent’s
undocumented status alone demonstrates unfitness”); Hall, supra note 12 at
1461–62 (“Despite the relatively small number of cases that have come before
appellate courts and the relatively high percentage of those cases that have had
parent-friendly outcomes, there is reason to suspect that parent-friendly
outcomes are the exception, not the rule.”); see also A Family Ripped Apart:
Mother of Four Fighting for Return of Children Put in Foster Care After Judge
Ruled She Abandoned Them While Detained for Illegal Immigration, DAILY
MAIL (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2095743/AmeliaReyes-Jimenez-Immigrant-mother-fighting-return-children-foster-care.html.
Rabin, supra note 15, at 102; Hall, supra note 12, at 1462.
Marcia Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 83.
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detention or having been deported. 18 Lack of coordination between
state child protective services agencies and federal immigration
enforcement officials compound the problems of immigrant parents
ensnared in concurrent family law and immigration proceedings.19
These problems recall the obstacles faced by Native American
parents in maintaining custody over their children. Prior to the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978, an alarming number of Native
American children were separated from their parents, sent to foster
homes, and put up for adoption in white, Christian families. 20 This
process was largely due to cultural prejudices against Native American
family traditions and Native Americans’ difficulty in successfully
navigating the American family court system. 21 Similarly, Ms.
Baltazar Cruz was unable to rely on any special legal protections to
assist her in navigating an unfamiliar legal system—that viewed her
ethno-linguistic background and immigration status with suspicion—
and prevent her newborn baby from being placed with a white family
against her express wishes.
The striking parallels between the difficulties Native American
families faced in the mid-twentieth century and what immigrant
parents are facing today, discussed in the pages below, brings me to
suggest that the ICWA can serve as a useful legislative model for
advocates of immigrant family unity. As history repeats itself in
making it difficult for marginalized communities to maintain family
unity in the United States, we should learn from the past and enact
protections similar to those in the ICWA for immigrant parents.
Parts II and III of this Note dissect the question of why immigrant
parents are threatened with losing their parental rights. Part II explores
the relevant family law background, emphasizing recent developments
that make it more likely for immigrant parents to face termination of
their parental rights. Part III examines the relevant immigration law
background, particularly recently passed legislation that threatens
more immigrants with deportation. It analyzes the “coordination
concerns” between the bodies of law, suggesting that lack of
coordination between immigration enforcement officials and child
18
19
20

21

Hall, supra note 12, at 1462.
See Rabin, supra note 15, at 102.
See Catherine Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years,
A Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 662 (1994); Mary
Charlotte McMullen, Preserving the Indian Family, 2 CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32,
33 (1981).
Id.
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protective services officials is an important factor leading to immigrant
parents unnecessarily facing termination of their parental rights. Part
III suggests coordination issues between family and international law
also place the United States in violation of customary international
law.
Part IV discusses the history of other minority families in this
country, particularly Native American families, to suggest that the
current problem may also be a function of historically-rooted cultural
prejudice against non-white and non-traditional families in the United
States. This Part goes on to discuss the federal response to the
alarming rates of the termination of parental rights in Native
Americans: the Indian Child Welfare Act. Lastly, this Note concludes
with a proposal that the ICWA should serve as a model for a solution
to alleviate the threats to immigrant family unity today.
II. FAMILY LAW: INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL PRINCIPLES
This Part briefly examines family law at the constitutional, state,
and federal levels and how it relates to immigrant parents. Laws
defining parental unfitness and grounds for the termination of parental
rights vary from state to state. However, the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA) virtually compels states to initiate TPR
proceedings when a child has been separated from her parent for 15 of
the preceding 22 months. 22 Part II concludes that the ASFA trigger
mechanism, combined with the propensity of some family courts to 1)
consider immigration status in parental fitness determinations and 2)
devalue non-Western parenting traditions, has led to unnecessary
initiations of TPR proceedings and, in some cases, unnecessary
terminations of parental rights.
A. Federal Constitutional Protections Animating State Family
Law
The states have traditionally exercised discretion over matters of
family law.23 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed federal
constitutional safeguards to protect the due process rights of parents
subject to termination of their parental rights. The Court has found that
22
23

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)–(F) (2006).
Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states,
and not to the laws of the United States.”).
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a natural parent’s right to raise his child is a fundamental liberty
interest. 24 And as the Court in Santosky v. Kramer noted, “The
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State.”25 Terminating a parent’s parental rights “work[s] a
unique kind of deprivation” that does not merely infringe on but rather
extinguishes the liberty interest identified above.26
Thus, states must provide a hearing for the parent27 and prove, by
at least clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit before
terminating his or her parental rights.28 As the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to undocumented as well as documented persons in the United
States,29 by implication, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
applies to undocumented immigrant parents as well as documented
ones.30 The Court has also found that the United States’ Constitution
does not guarantee parents the appointment of counsel in TPR
proceedings.31 However, the majority of states provide for that right.32
24

25
26
27
28

29

30

31
32

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[F]reedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental interest protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 605, 651 (1972) (“The
private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference, and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.”).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70. The “best interests of the child” standard that
permeates the courts’ approach to family law issues involving children, cannot
be considered until a parent has been held as unfit by the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard. Id. at 760.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (holding that both the Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “were
fashioned . . . to reach every exercise of state authority” and extend to those who
entered the United States unlawfully).
See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. 2011) (en
banc) (held, in a case involving an illegal immigrant parent, that the court must
apply the clear and convincing standard in terminating parental rights); see also
Hall, supra note 12, at 1465.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.
Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (2006).
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While states are not constitutionally required to provide an appeals
process for termination decisions, 33 indigent parents do have equal
protection and due process rights to receive trial transcripts in order to
prepare an appeal of a court’s termination decision if and when an
appeal is available.34
B. Family Law Procedures: Parental Fitness Determinations
and Terminations of Parental Rights
There is significant variation among each states’ procedures for
initiating the termination of parental rights and their definitions of the
grounds justifying TPR. 35 However, a general pattern may be
identified. Once a child has been taken into temporary custody by the
state or a foster family, child protective services agencies have an
obligation to make “reasonable efforts” to implement a reunification
plan between parent and child and assist the parent in complying with
the plan before initiating TPR proceedings. 36 Once the “reasonable
efforts” test has been satisfied, courts often terminate parental rights
on, among other grounds, the following bases: 1) abandonment, 2)
abuse or neglect, 3) failure to support or maintain contact with the
child, 4) failure to adhere to a reunification or rehabilitation plan, 5)
failure to remedy a persistent condition that caused the removal of a
child, 6) mental illness or deficiency, 7) drug- or alcohol-induced
incapacity, or 8) the prior termination of parental rights in another
child.37
In several recent cases, state courts have considered a parent’s
illegal entry into the United States and a parent’s immigrant detainee
status as negative factors in determining parental fitness. 38 In re
33

34
35

36
37

38

See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“[A] State is not required by the
Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at
all.”).
M.L.B v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996).
S. Adam Ferguson, Comment, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 94 (2007).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006).
Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV. 2, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide
/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.cfm; see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-C:5 (2011).
See, e.g., In re B and J Minors, 279 Mich. App. 12 (2009) (reviewing a lower
court’s holding that the deported parents in question “were . . . unable to provide
proper care and custody for the children”); In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., No. SD
30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d by 332 S.W.3d 793
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Angelica L. is one such example. The juvenile court found the parent
unfit and terminated her parental rights in part because she “either A)
embarked on an unauthorized trip to the United States with a newborn
premature infant or B) [after entering illegally,] gave birth to a
premature infant in the United States.” 39 This is profoundly
problematic because a parent’s immigration status has virtually no
bearing on her intrinsic ability to provide the minimum of care for her
child that is considered adequate for parental fitness.40 This trend of
family courts conflating parental fitness with immigration status is
jeopardizing the parental rights of immigrant parents41 and courts must
immediately correct this erroneous interpretation of fitness.
Finally, child protective agency determinations to seek the
termination of immigrant parental rights and state court decisions on
the issue may be influenced by cultural bias against some immigrant
parents. Marcia Yablon-Zug and others have highlighted the
contention that the fitness of undocumented parents is easily called
into question.42 They have found that when an immigrant parent is to
be deported, courts and child protective agency officials may: 1) shy
away from sending U.S. citizen children to live with their deported
parents in foreign countries where economic opportunities are lacking
and the children may not be familiar with the language or customs; 2)
consider life in the United States to be more desirable and in the
children’s best interests; and 3) favorably consider the situation in
which an American family, usually in current custody of the child,
petitions to adopt the child.43
Officials may also assume undocumented immigrant parents are
unable to financially provide for their children, especially if they
cannot verify that the parents are legally employed.44 Since employers
are legally prohibited from hiring undocumented workers, proving a
source of legal income is difficult for many undocumented parents.45

39

40
41
42
43
44
45

(Mo. 2011) (finding that the parent’s “lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into a
country illegally . . . is not a lifestyle . . . for a child.”).
In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 87–88 (Neb. 2009) (quoting the juvenile
court decision, which it reversed).
See Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 87.
Hall, supra note 12, at 1484–85.
Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 65.
Hall, supra note 12, at 1481–82.
APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 10, at 20.
Id.
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Additionally, child protective agency officials may be more willing to
recommend that a court remove a child from his or her parent’s
custody or terminate parental rights because, as in the case of Ms.
Baltazar Cruz, they view some immigrant parenting traditions such as
breastfeeding, co-sleeping, or shared parenting by an extended family
as undesirable by traditional Western standards. 46 These biases
disadvantage immigrant parents in the struggle to maintain their
parental rights.47
C. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) and
the Termination “Trigger”
Congress has also occasionally regulated child custody matters
despite state law typically governing family law. For example, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 conditioned state
receipt of federal funds on states making “reasonable efforts” to
reunify children with their parents before placing the children in foster
care.48 Congress’ most relevant contribution to this body of law is the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”).49 Here, Congress
attempted to achieve permanence for children in the foster care
system 50 by requiring states that receive federal funds for child
protective services to commence procedures to begin TPR proceedings
for children who have lived in foster care for fifteen of the preceding
twenty-two months.51
Under ASFA, twelve months after a child has entered foster care,
the state must schedule a “permanency hearing” to determine whether
the child should be: “(1) returned to the parent; (2) placed for
adoption, in which case the state will petition to terminate parental
rights; (3) referred for legal guardianship; or (4) placed in another
planned living arrangement.” 52 A state court may accept a child
protective agency’s conclusion that reunification between the child and
46

47

48
49
50

51
52

See Complaint supra note 1, at 19–20; see also Annette R. Appell, Bad Mothers
and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 759, 776–77 (2007).
Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 113–14 (“Courts and child welfare agencies
routinely express concerns regarding the language, values and lifestyle of
undocumented immigrants in immigrant parent termination cases.”).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006).
Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–679c (1997).
Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)–(F) (2006).
Adler, supra note 50, at 8.
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his parent is unreasonable as sufficient grounds for terminating
parental rights.53
While the ASFA does not consider a parent unfit by virtue of his
child living in foster care for twelve of the preceding twenty-two
months period, some state courts have attached a presumption of
unfitness to that arrangement.54 Further, it is too easy for immigrant
detainee parents, who are often bounced around our nation’s
patchwork of immigration detention facilities for many months and
then scheduled for deportation, to meet the twelve-month or fifteenmonth mark of being separated from their children. Agency officials
may determine that reunification is unreasonable, especially if the
parent has been deported. Or, a state court may determine the child as
abandoned, and parental rights terminations may sometimes proceed
over the parent’s objections without a proper fitness determination.55
III. IMMIGRATION POLICY, NON-COORDINATION WITH
FAMILY LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS
As state and federal family law facilitates the initiation of TPR
proceedings against immigrant detainee parents, recent federal
immigration legislation has increased the likelihood that parents may
be placed in immigration detention in the first place. This Part
describes the basic immigration policy framework and recent
legislation that expands the categories of immigrants subject to
detention and deportation. It notes that while the Obama
administration has increased prosecutorial discretion of immigration
enforcement officials to limit deportations of otherwise law-abiding
immigrants, subsequent administrations may not be as flexible.
Further, this Part concludes that the recent anti-immigrant
development in immigration law has exacerbated coordination
problems between immigration and family law and has increased the
number of immigrant parents simultaneously seeking to avoid losing
their children and being removed from this country. Finally, this Part
observes that our nation’s failure to take steps to prevent unnecessary
breakups of immigrant parents seems to violate customary
international law on family unity and the rights of the child.

53
54
55

Id. at 7.
Hall, supra note 12, at 1469–70.
Id. at 1472.

574

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 562

A. Immigration Policy Background
In contrast to family law, immigration law has generally been
under exclusive federal control.56 The elected branches of our federal
government set our nation’s immigration policy, and shifting
American sentiments over immigration have periodically led to both
stricter and more relaxed immigration laws. The Court has recognized
“plenary power” in the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government to set immigration policy, with minimal judicial
review.57 The seminal piece of federal immigration legislation is the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which Congress has
periodically amended in the decades since its enactment.58 Presidential
administrations also affect immigration policy. For example, the
president may direct administrative officials to use their discretion in
enforcing removal laws or allowing for cancellation of deportation in
given situations.59
Moreover, the American citizenry’s alternately friendly and hostile
sentiments towards immigrants have also shaped our nation’s
immigration policies. 60 The turn of the 20th century was an era in
which the United States had a fairly exclusionary immigration policy,
while the 1960s through the 1990s marked a more inclusionary time.61

56

57

58

59

60

61

E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of
exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated
by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of
the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one.”). But see Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration
Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749,
1751,1754 (2011) (examining the “expanding landscape of immigration
enforcement” at the state and local level “under the auspices of regulating
crime”).
See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 347 (2008).
Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1803 (“[T]he Immigration and Nationality
Act . . . remains the statutory framework for federal immigration law.”).
Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611
(2006) (“The executive enjoys its customary authority not to pursue
enforcement, and Congress has authorized the executive to formally exempt
deportable aliens from removal for sympathetic or compelling reasons.”).
Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2 (1984).
Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1802–03.
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B. Recent Legislation: Immigrants at Increasing Risk of
Detention and Removal
In 1996, the pendulum swung again. Congress passed two laws
making it easier to detain non-citizens: the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).62 The AEDPA
scaled back the discretionary authority of administrative officials to
cancel removal for certain classes of immigrants by changing the
standard of discretion from “exceptional” hardship to the immigrant
and his family to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”63 The
AEDPA also limited judicial review of removal decisions.64
Meanwhile, the IIRIRA expanded the aggravated felony definition
to include all convictions that resulted in a prison sentence of one year
or more.65 Given that immigrants who have committed an aggravated
felony are not eligible for cancellation of removal, 66 the IIRIRA
further reduced administrative discretion to cancel removal and
expanded the universe of immigrants who cannot successfully appeal
their removal to include those convicted for crimes classified under the
criminal justice system as misdemeanors.67
Thus, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA increased the likelihood that
U.S. citizen children would be separated from their immigrant parents
by increasing the likelihood that immigrant parents would be removed.
An immigrant parent who has been detained and who has been
convicted of an act for which he was sentenced to a year or more in

62

63

64
65

66
67

Lee Gelernt, The 1996 Immigration Legislation and the Assault on the Courts,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 455 (2001).
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006); see also Hagan et. al., supra note 10, at
1804–05; Podgorny, supra note 9, at 295 (noting that the AEDPA also changed
the language of turning out immigrants from our borders from “deportation” or
“exclusion” to “removal”).
ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 222 (2010).
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 671, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-720–22
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)); see also Hagan et. al.,
supra note 10, at 1804.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006).
Podgorny, supra note 9, at 296. “The definition of aggravated felony for the
purpose of removing individuals from the United States has been expanded so
that now an aggravated felony need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.”
Id. at 289.
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prison is no longer eligible for cancellation of removal. 68 Further,
because family separation is not viewed as “extraordinary and
extremely unusual,” 69 the AEDPA’s stricter standard of discretion
means that immigrant parents are foreclosed from arguing that being
separated from their U.S. citizen children is a hardship that merits
cancellation of removal. The sole remaining argument immigrant
parents may advance to seek cancellation due to family hardship is to
claim that if their children depart the country with them, they will face
extraordinary and extremely unusual hardship in the country to which
they depart.70
Moreover, following the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the PATRIOT Act. 71 This Act further increased the likelihood
that immigrants would be detained and separated from their families
for months at a time as it “further expanded the categories of
immigrants eligible for deportation . . . who are perceived as threats to
national security or seen as opposing U.S. foreign policy.”72
As a result of the AEDPA, IIRIRA, and the PATRIOT Act, the
number of immigrants in immigration detention has dramatically risen
in the last ten years.73 For example, the number of immigrant detainees
doubled between 2003 and 2008.74 In the fiscal year 2010, the U.S.
government detained approximately 363,000 immigrants.75
68
69

70
71

72

73
74

75

See supra note 65.
David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1171 (2006) (“[S]eparation from family
members is “simply one of the ‘common results of deportation or exclusion
[that] are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.’” (quoting Jimenez v. Immig.
Naturalization Serv., No. 96-70169 (9th Cir. 1997))).
Id.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 § 412(a), 115 Stat.
272, 351 (2001).
Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1804. See also Michael T. McCarthy, USA
Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 449 (2002) (“The effect of the USA
Patriot Act . . . is to allow the Attorney General to detain indefinitely not only
those convicted of crimes or immigration offenses, as under old law, but also
any person the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is a terrorist
or ‘is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the
United States.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3)(B) (2001))).
See infra footnotes 85–86 and accompanying text.
Nina Bernstein, Immigration Detention System Lapses Detailed, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/us/03immig.html.
APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 10, at 7.
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C. The Obama Administration’s Prosecutorial Approach
The Obama administration has taken a somewhat more tolerant
approach to immigration policy. While legislation like the proposed
Dream Act has failed in Congress,76 the administration has relied on its
prosecutorial discretion to craft a new policy in mid-2011 that targets
its immigration enforcement resources at national security risks,
serious felons, known gang members, and those who have repeatedly
flouted the nation’s immigration laws.77 Last spring, the administration
also created an administrative workaround to functionally implement
many of the Dream Act’s provisions.78 Finally, President Obama has
made comprehensive immigration reform a legislative priority of his
second term in office.79 At the same time, the immigration officials are
deemphasizing enforcement against undocumented immigrants who do
not pose a threat to public safety and explicitly consider an
immigrant’s family ties in the country and whether he or she has U.S.
citizen children as weighing against enforcement.80 The administration
is also focusing on sanctioning employers of illegal immigrant labor as
opposed to raiding workplaces to punish the immigrants who are hired
to perform the labor 81 and centralizing our nation’s immigration
detention system.82
76

77

78

79

80

81

82

David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics
/19immig.html.
Memorandum from John Morton, Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 5 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf.
Julia Preston and John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegalimmigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Jennifer Epstein, Obama Renews Push on Immigration Reform, POLITICO (Mar.
27, 2013), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-onimmigration-reform-160372.html.
See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 77, at 4; see also Charlie
Savage, 2901 Arrested in Crackdown on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/crackdown-oncriminal-immigrants-operation-cross-check-brings-2901-arrests.html.
Julia Preston, U.S. Shifts Strategy on Illicit Work by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES(
Jul. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/us/03immig.html.
Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/politics/06detain.html.
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Advocates for immigrants are optimistic that, in the short run,
these policy changes may help preserve immigrant family unity by
decreasing the number of immigrant parents targeted for removal. 83
However, it is too soon to fully evaluate the effect of these
administrative policies on immigrant parents.84 Further, these policies
are subject to change upon the election of a new administration,
emphasizing the need for statutory, not administrative, remedies to
protect immigrant parents.
D. Lack of Coordination between Family and Immigration
Law
As this review of family law and immigration law principles
suggests, a tension exists between the at-times contradictory goals of
our nation’s immigration and family law systems. This is both
unfortunate and ironic considering that, in the words of one
commentator, “[f]amily unity is a foundation of contemporary United
States immigration law and policy.” 85 Further, when an immigrant
parent must simultaneously navigate both our immigration and family
law systems, usually as an immigrant detainee at risk of losing his
parental rights, unintentional coordination failures between the two
systems of law creates setbacks that further jeopardize an immigrant’s
parental rights.
Three primary coordination concerns can be identified. First, as
mentioned above, the ASFA trigger mechanism for a state initiating
TPR proceedings against a parent can be pulled by immigration
officials placing a parent in immigration detention, thereby separating
him from his child for what can end up being months or even years.86
Second, practical problems with communication and legal
representation arise when an immigrant parent is held in immigration
detention while an involuntary child custody proceeding is initiated
against him. 87 For example, 1.4 million detainees were transferred
83

84

85

86
87

Julia Preston, In Test of Deportation Policy, 1 in 6 Get a Fresh Look and a
Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/us
/in-test-of-deportation-policy-1-in-6-offered-reprieve.html.
Preliminary data, however, do reveal that immigrant parents are benefiting from
this administrative policy shift. See id.
Maria Pabón López, A Tale of Two Systems: Analyzing the Treatment of
Noncitizen Families in State Family Law Systems and Under the Immigration
Law System, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 229, 229 (2008).
See supra notes 52–53.
See Hall, supra note 12, at 1472.
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between 1999 and 2008, often to locations hundreds of miles away
from their homes and families in the United States.88 Consequently, a
parent may easily be shifted across the country from one detention
facility to another with little or no warning.89 His ability to receive
notice of this move and defend himself in the proceedings is also
diminished, especially if he lacks representation.90 Third, the court is
likely to consider the parent’s restricted movement and inability to
contact his or her child during the time in detention as a negative
factor in the court’s parental fitness determination—construing the
parent’s failure to communicate as constituting abandonment or
neglect.91
Even when immigrant parents face deportation without the threat
of TPR proceedings, such parents must still make the wrenching
decision of whether to uproot their children from the United States and
bring them to the often unfamiliar and economically underdeveloped
nations of their origin or leave their children with family members or
friends to grow up without them.92 The failure of coordination between
federal immigration and state child protective agencies, however,
means that state courts sometimes strip that decision making authority
from the parents, a troubling development in the intersection between
family and immigration law.93
E. Coordination Failures as Flouting Customary International
Norms Regarding Family Unity
In addition to the problematic domestic implications of separating
children from their parents, these separations also arguably violate
customary international law.94 Unnecessarily removing children from
88
89

90
91
92

93
94

Bernstein, supra note 74.
See Rabin, supra note 15, at 119–21 (describing the difficulties child protective
agencies, courts, and attorneys had in tracking down and communicating with
immigrant detainees).
Id.
See Hall, supra note 12, at 1472.
See Erica Stief, Comment, Impractical Relief and the Innocent Victims: How
United States Immigration Law Ignores the Rights of Citizen Children, 79
UMKC L. REV. 477, 478 (2011) (quoting a father whose immigrant wife was
recently removed as explaining, “It’s unbelievable if you think about our little
boy, what his choices are . . . to be able to be in a good environment in his
country or to be able to hug his mom.”).
Rabin, supra note 15, at 102.
Stief, supra note 92, at 492 (“[I]nternational customary law . . . does not permit
the unnecessary separation of families.”). But see Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer,
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the custody of immigrant parents or terminating parental rights would
seem to violate international norms that elevate family unity to a
human right.95
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
codifies the right of a child to live with her natural parents, affirms the
international community’s commitment to family unity 96 in
conjunction with other conventions and international principles such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.97
As a concept ripens into customary international law when it has
been widely practiced by the international community, 98 the various
treaties and practices of other nations seem to have, at the very least,
created an international norm supporting family unity.99 As a member
and purported leader of the international community, the United States

95

96

97

98

99

Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. IT’L L.
213, 230 (2003) (“It is probably too early to argue that a general norm against
family separation has achieved the status of customary international law.”).
A related problem is the failure of U.S. immigration law to consider the “best
interests of the child” when a child is affected by an immigration proceeding. A
parent who is scheduled for removal may be forced to leave his child behind in
the United States. Absent proving “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship,” he will be unable to cancel removal to be with his child. Bridgette A.
Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration
Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 123 (2009) (“Under
current United States immigration law, accompanied children who are directly
affected by immigration proceedings have no opportunity for their best interests
to be considered.”); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text. However,
addressing this important problem is beyond the scope of this Note.
The treaty was subsequently ratified by all United Nations member nations with
the exception of the United States and Somalia. Stief, supra note 92, at 477. The
United States frequently refuses to ratify international agreements, including
human rights treaties, because of concerns about maintaining sovereignty.
Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United
States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 166–67 (2006).
Anna-Liisa Jacobson, Dividing Lives: How Deporting Legal and Illegal
Immigrants with United States-born Children is Separating Families and Why
United States and International Laws are Failing Families, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 191, 208–11 (2011).
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (declaring that the
world creates custom”[b]y an ancient usage among civilized
nations . . . gradually ripening into a rule of international law . . . .”).
Starr and Brilmayer, supra note 94, at 230.
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has a moral and legal obligation to conform to customary international
norms. However, allowing U.S. family law and immigration law to
result in unnecessary separations of immigrant parents and their
children and terminations of immigrant parental rights appears to fly in
the face of this norm. While enforcement of this norm against the
United States by the international community or by U.S. citizen
children seems unlikely, there have been instances in which
international courts have found claims against the United States
alleging violations of international human rights laws to be
justiciable.100
IV. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: FINDING ECHOES OF THE
CURRENT SITUTATION IN THE PLIGHTS OF NATIVE
AMERICAN FAMILIES
The situation facing immigrant parents and their U.S. citizen
children is analogous to the problems faced by Native American—and
to a lesser extent, Irish and African-American—parents and children in
decades past. In all three instances, bias against the mentioned
minorities, borne of cultural differences and socioeconomic
stratification, was built into the U.S. child welfare system, resulting in
disproportionately high levels of separation between parents and
children for the groups in question.101 Part IV examines how and why
Native American families faced disproportionately high levels of
separation and terminations of parental rights, parallels to the situation
facing immigrant families today, and the genesis of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, setting up this Note’s conclusion that a similar legislative
act on behalf of immigrant parents may solve many of the current-day
threats to immigrant family unity.

100

101

See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Jessica Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging
Model for Domestic Violence & Human Rights Advocacy in the United States,
21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 184 (2008) (tracing the 2007 decision by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights that declared the organization had
judicial competence to examine the human rights claims of a U.S. citizen and
domestic violence victim who had unsuccessfully sought redress in the U.S.
courts).
Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 109 (“The current removals of minority
immigrant children from their homes may be a repetition of . . . history.”).
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A. Challenges to Family Unity for Native Americans and
Parallels to Challenges Facing Immigrant Parents Today
This Note primarily focuses on the parallels between Native
American and immigrant families because they are the most apt.
However, it is important to note that in the nineteenth century, before
the rise of the nation’s child welfare system, hundreds of thousands of
Irish and free African-American children were separated from their
families and sent to work and to be adopted out West. 102 One
commentator describes this movement as an attempt by overzealous
social reformers to instill “[w]hite, middle-class values and work
ethic” in immigrant and black children.103
Our nation’s long history of institutional disrespect for Native
American autonomy extended to the Native American family unit.
Native American children were often permanently separated from their
parents throughout the 1800s. Social reformers, known as the Friends
of the Indian, pushed for Native American children to be educated in
federal boarding schools and assimilate to the ways of white Christian
Americans.104 In the twentieth century, separations continued to occur,
this time within the developing governmental child welfare system.
Child protective officials often perceived Native American parents as
unfit and placed the children in foster care or up for adoption. 105
Consequently, an estimated 25% of Native American children were
separated from their parents during the 1960s and 1970s.106
102

103
104

105

106

Appell, supra note 46, at 763–64 (explaining the efforts of the “child saver”
reform movement to send poor Catholic and free African-American children
separated from their parents and who were often not orphans on “orphan trains
bound for adoption and work.”).
Appell, supra note 46, at 763–64.
Linda Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 356 & 359 (1986–1987).
Id., at 375–76. Research shows that child protective officials removed the vast
majority of Native American children for reasons that did not include physical
abuse. Indian Child Welfare Program: Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs,
of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 4 (1974) (statement of
William Byler, Exec. Dir., Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs). Rather, officials based
their removal decisions on factors such as deprivation, neglect, and poverty,
often making (negative) normative assumptions about the Native American way
of life. Id.
Indian Child Welfare Program: Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, of the
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of
William Byler, Exec. Dir., Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs).
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There are multiple similarities between the challenges faced by
twentieth-century Native American parents and those confronting
immigrant parents of today. For one, similar to how immigrant parents
in detention can fail to learn or understand of custody or TPR
proceedings initiated against them, Native American parents would
often unknowingly relinquish their parental rights when social services
agencies provided them with parental rights waivers in conjunction
with welfare receipt forms.107 Second, just as child protective services
officials view some immigrant parenting traditions with suspicion,
child protective services officials perceived Native American
traditions such as communal parenting as a form of neglect or
abandonment. 108 Third, both groups frequently lacked access to the
family courts, preventing parents from appealing terminations
decisions.109
Fourth, courts and child services officials used parental alcoholism
as a reason for terminating parental rights much the same way they use
a parent’s immigration status today.110 One commentator notes:
Because of the pervasiveness of addiction diseases in native
peoples, members of Congress and those who testified on behalf of
ICWA’s passage were concerned that the occurrence of alcoholism in
American Indian families was being used by non-Indian social work
professionals to intervene and remove children . . . without proper
inquiry into the child’s circumstances in the larger or extended
family.111
Finally, it is interesting to note that many of the immigrant parents
who have the greatest difficulty in communicating with child
107

108

109

110
111

See supra note 87 and accompanying text; Preserving the Indian Family, 2
CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32, 33 (1981). Native American parents would often
unknowingly relinquish their parental rights when social services agencies
provided them with parental rights waivers in conjunction with welfare receipt
forms. Id.
Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward
a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 603
(2002).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer
of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1997).
See Brooks, supra note 20, at 686.
Id. To affirm this point, data suggests that in non-Native American communities
that had comparable rates of alcoholism, adjudications of parental neglect were
much lower. Preserving the Indian Family, 2 CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32, 33
(1981).
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protective services officials are indigenous Mexican, Central, and
South American immigrants who, like Ms. Baltazar Cruz, do not speak
fluent Spanish. 112 These indigenous immigrants are underserved by
child protective services agencies unused to interacting with nonSpanish or Portuguese-speaking Latin American immigrants.113
There are also, of course, differences between the two situations.
Unlike immigrant families, Native American communities also feared
extinction if their children continued to be taken into the foster care
system and adopted by non-Native American families at such high
rates. Further, Native Americans were concerned about maintaining
tribal sovereignty in the face of U.S. government interference in their
family structures. 114 The similarities, however, allow us to examine
how the federal government tried to solve the issues affecting Native
American parents once it became aware of the extent of the problem.
B. The Indian Child Welfare Act
Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978. 115 The ICWA strengthened the procedural
safeguards against the unnecessary termination of Native American
parental rights. For one, the ICWA grants Native American tribes
jurisdiction in child custody proceedings involving an “Indian child
who resides or is domiciled” in an Indian reservation and allows
Native American parents, custodians, or tribes to request transfer of
venue to tribal jurisdiction in a state court custody proceeding if an
Indian child is not subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction.116
The statute also contains special notice requirements when Indian
children are involved in an involuntary child custody proceedings,
provides for right to counsel for Native American parents in a child
112

113

114

115
116

See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text; Aaron Nelsen, Torn Apart: How
the Government Separates Parents and Children, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 20,
2011), http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/torn_apart_how_the_federal_govern
ment_separates_parents_and_children/.
See Claudia Torrens, Some N.Y. Immigrants Cite Lack of Spanish as a Barrier,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 28, 2011), available at http://cnsnews.com/news
/articles/some-ny-immigrants-cite-lack-spanish-barrier.
Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 600
(1993–1994).
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006).
Michael C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 815, 826–27 (1995).
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custody proceeding, heightens the standard of proof required for
termination of parental rights to “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and
requires child protective officials exert “active efforts” to provide
remedial and rehabilitative programming to Native American families
before initiating the foster care placement process.117
Further, the ICWA creates a placement preference system for
Native American parents to voluntarily consent for their children to be
adopted or placed into foster care by family members, other Native
American families from their communities, or families licensed to care
for Indian children “absent good cause to the contrary.”118 Finally, the
ICWA provides a process for parents to recover their parental rights
(or tribes to recover their children) if a court fails to follow ICWA
requirements119 as a way for parents to petition to recover custody of
their children even after they have voluntarily consented for their child
to be adopted.120
While some have questioned the effectiveness of the ICWA in the
decades after its passage, 121 the Act has undoubtedly reduced the
amount of abuse in the child welfare system as it pertains to Native
American families.122 Indeed, Native American parents are still using

117
118
119

120
121

122

25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006); see also Snyder, supra note 116, at 831–32.
25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2006).
25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (“Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for
foster care placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any
parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the
Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to
invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.”).
25 U.S.C. § 1913(b-d) (2006).
Sloan Philips, The Indian Child Welfare Act in the Face of Extinction, 21 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 351, 355 (1997) (“For many, the purposes of the ICWA have not
been realized; Indian children are not being protected.”); Atwood, supra note
108, at 588 (“By some accounts the Act has been the victim of entrenched state
court hostility ever since its enactment . . . .); see also Lara Sullivan and Amy
Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NPR (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuelfoster-system (examining the disproportionately high number of Native
American children being placed into state foster care systems today in spite of
the Indian Child Welfare Act).
Atwood, supra note 108, at 621 (2002) (“The ICWA has achieved considerable
success in stemming unwarranted removals by state officials of Indian children
from their families and communities.”).
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the statute to enforce their rights in court today.123 Admittedly, some
of the reasons for the ICWA, including the potential extinction of
several Native American communities if removal and assimilation of
Native American children continued at pre-1978 rates, do not exist
here.124 However, both Native American and immigrant parents have
faced and continue to face a child welfare system that undervalues
their ability to parent due in part to cultural bias and a system which
too often terminates their parental rights. 125 As a result, enacting a
statute modeled on the Indian Child Welfare Act on behalf of
immigrant parents and their U.S. citizen children may help protect the
rights of the families to avoid being unnecessarily divided under the
auspices of American family law.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to Cirila Baltazar Cruz’s story, if legislation akin to the
Indian Child Welfare Act had been in place when Ms. Baltazar Cruz
had her baby taken from her, Ms. Baltazar Cruz would have had far
more resources at her disposal in order to reunify with her child. For
example, if she had been appointed assistance of counsel, an attorney
would have been able to help her regain custody more quickly. If the
Mississippi Department of Health Services had been required to make
“active efforts” to provide remedial and rehabilitative resources to Ms.
Baltazar Cruz before initiating TPR proceedings, MDHS would have
likely never pursued TPR proceedings at all. If MDHS had pursued
TPR but a heightened burden of proof had been in place, Ms. Baltazar
Cruz would have never seriously feared losing her parental rights
given the scarcity of evidence against her.
123

124

125

Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to
Weigh In, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/baby-veronicas-loved-ones-wait-for-the-supreme-court-to-weighin/2013/04/14/7138b5f0-a526-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989) (“While
much of the [Congressional] testimony [preceding the enactment of the
ICWA] . . . focused on the harm to Indian parents and their children who were
involuntarily separated by decisions of local welfare authorities, there was also
considerable emphasis on the impact on the tribes themselves of the massive
removal of their children.”); see also Philips, supra note 121, at 352.
See Appell, supra note 46, at 777–78 (highlighting “aspects of the child welfare
system that are most solipsistic, dominant norm-driven, and, thus so
disrespectful” to non-white, non-English speaking parents such as Native
Americans and Latinos).
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Of course, child protective services agencies and family courts will
need to undertake additional, more specific steps to prevent stories like
those of Ms. Baltazar Cruz from happening in the future. For example,
child protective services agencies should exhibit greater cultural
sensitivity to different parenting traditions and provide language
access for parents they are investigating. Further, state courts should
take care to separate a parent’s immigration status from their fitness as
a parent. Perhaps additional federal legislation on these issues is
necessary as well, given their import. However, the Indian Child
Welfare Act can serve as a starting point for addressing the threats to
parental rights facing immigrants in our country. History repeated
itself in how we are treating immigrant families today; perhaps we can
repeat history in a positive way by enacting an ICWA equivalent to
correct our mistakes.

